What pace marks reform?

I’m grateful to Alan for the chance to contribute to this blog, even if the timing means my initial post is a self-referential link to this Op-Ed in today’s Denver Post.

The Post’s editors contributed the title and made a few edits for space. The deleted text was this: To draw even with the state on student proficiency within a decade, DPS realistically needs an increase in CSAP of at least 3 points every year. However as DPS has never made 3 overall points of progress in any single year, much less for 10 years straight, the chances are roughly equal to the Broncos winning the Beijing Olympics.

So whether one sees the recent DPS scores as a glass half-empty or half-full, Denver’s considerable talent, effort and money have produced, at best, incremental improvement. And it should also be clear by now that incremental improvement is not enough to provide another generation of Denver’s children with the educational opportunities they need.

My personal belief – not in the Op-Ed – is that reform undertaken at a slow pace is likely doomed to failure, and that the recent admirable gains from DPS can either serve as an accelerator to greater reform, or if taken as evidence that the current efforts are adequate, will soon be a historical blip.

For example, see this DPS press release about recent substantial improvements on the CSAPs. Just don’t miss that it is from August of 2005. History is a strong opponent.

My question is this: If one believes DPS is indeed making adequate yearly progress (sorry), is it reasonable to wait another generation or more just to equal to the Colorado average? If not, what should be done? I hope some of you will have ideas that eclipse mine.

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Can DPS Excel?

Written three years ago, the Denver Plan begins:

“We believe that over the next decade Denver can lead the nation’s cities in student achievement . . . .”

But even with this year’s substantial gains in reading, the trajectory of CSAP results mean that over the next decade Denver will not only fail to lead the nation’s cities, we will remain well below the average in our own, below-average state.

Even assuming zero improvement anywhere else in Colorado, it will be 15 years before Denver equals the state average. To draw even within a decade, DPS realistically needs an increase in CSAP of at least 3 points every year — twice the existing pace.

These statistics are not the bad news. The bad news is that they persist despite the most talented DPS administration in memory. They persist despite the deep engagement of large numbers of Denver’s citizens, and despite millions of dollars from taxpayers and philanthropies.

The Achilles heel of smart people with good intentions is overestimating one’s ability to affect change: DPS is trying to transform itself almost entirely through processes and resources under its direct control. The end result is a limited range of tactics and thinking when a diversity of approaches and ideas is vital.

In contrast, the two cities with the most recent student achievement gains have relinquished control and increased variety — New York by design and New Orleans by disaster. These cities took different paths to a strategy DPS should emulate: shift from acting solely as a school operator to also managing an array of independent organizations that run schools and provide services.

This shift is critical to break the chokehold of incremental change. Here are five places to start:

1. No new schools with old rules.

Attempts to recreate district schools have largely ignored best practices and withheld autonomy while retaining DPS leadership. Failing schools must be “rebooted” — closed and reopened one grade at a time with external leadership and increased control over curriculum, staffing, and budgets.

2. Evaluate new schools under one process.

DPS has three separate authorization tracks, allowing weak models and pet projects to emerge without competitive review. DPS now evaluates existing schools under a single performance framework; they should likewise have one process to judge all school applicants.

3. Recruit national operators.

Efforts to attract quality new school operators have consisted of issuing a request for proposals and hoping a crowd forms. DPS must actively court top national operators: Achievement First, Aspire, Green Dot, IDEA, KIPP, Uncommon Schools, YES, and others.

4. More external catalysts.

All organizations require new talent and ideas, yet over 95 percent of current principals were DPS employees three years ago. DPS needs to increase affiliations to attract and train new school leaders and teachers, and should enhance and add partnerships with organizations such as Teach for America, New Leaders for New Schools, New Teacher Project, and similar groups.

5. Accept risk and failure.

Critical to successful reform is the ability for schools to fail individually (instead of collectively). DPS needs to both take some risks on a variety of proven educational models while closing drastically underperforming schools.

In three years, DPS has made significant progress on fiscal management and academic measurement. This can be a platform for successful reform, but it should not be mistaken for reform itself. DPS needs to relinquish control, operate fewer schools better, and empower independent organizations.

Significant improvements to pubic education are not yet here, but they have never been closer.


Originally published in The Denver Post, August 3, 2008

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Parsing the ProComp impasse

Putting together some of the numbers from different sources of information on this dispute shows a connection that, for me at least, better explains the divide between the DCTA and DPS.

20% of teachers who start at DPS leave in the first 5 years; 9% of teachers who have taught 5 years leave before year 11; and only 1% of teachers who teach for 11 years ever leave. If you make it 11 years, the chances are overwhelmingly high that you are in for the full 30 to qualify for the DPS (now PERA) pension.

The economic incentives for these different groups — teachers with less than 11 years of service, and teachers with 11 years of more of service — are strikingly different. The pension benefits to a teacher with less than 11 years of service are minimal. The pension benefits for the full 30 years of service are extraordinary: for a teacher who began their career at age 25 or less and teaches for 30 years, the Piton Foundation calculated the pension value at about $1.25 million (yes, million). As with most things financial in the public sector, there is a downside and many economists would argue it is partly the considerable value of the pension which limits salaries, most significantly to new and young teachers (with a significant pension obligation, there is less money left over to increase base pay, particularly when that base pay has a multiplier effect that further increases pensions).

A significant, and perhaps even the core issue dividing the two sides, is which ProComp dollars are paid as a one-time bonus (DPS preference), or as part of base salary (DCTA position). The difference financially is significant: the final three years of base salary is the critical factor that determines pension amount. If an incentive bonus becomes part of base salary, instead of being a one-time payment, the increase factors into both every remaining year of salary and the entire life of the pension. A ProComp payment into base salary essentially becomes an increase that is paid out annually over potentially the next 30+ years.

So if you are the DCTA, which group is your core constituency? Teachers who will leave before 11 years of service, or teachers who will stay for between 11 and 30 years? It is hard to represent both groups equally well, so whom do you choose? Who do you think is the more vocal group? Who has more members on committees and in the governance structure? Who has more influence?

DCTA, regardless of one’s opinion on their practices, are clearly smart (and historically very effective). As the Union negotiating team, would you fight hard for the interests of people who will be DCTA members for between 5 and 11 years and leave? Or for those who will be union members for 30 years?  No contest there, and it’s clear who the current DCTA proposal favors.

At some point, young, smart teachers – the exact type that DPS and every other school system need most to recruit – even if they are not going to teach  for 30 years, need to better understand that they are supporting a system in which their voice is muted and from which they receive disproportionately small rewards. Maybe they would continue to retain the current structure, but not many people knowingly act against their own self-interest. The DCTA sure does not, nor do the teachers with 11 years experience.

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ProComp Revisited

The current DPS and DCTA debate on ProComp offers fresh data from each side’s proposal and a chance to revisit the original plan.  Still in its infancy, it is too early to judge ProComp a success or failure; but it is worth another look.  One should not need to build a whole house to judge if the foundation is any good.

Changing teacher compensation is critical to education reform, and Pay for Performance plans can be a significant catalyst to improve student achievement. Their value is threefold: 1) to mandate focus on a limited number of objectives; 2) to measure teacher effectiveness to see what works; and 3) to reward specific behaviors. Administrators often struggle with the first, as it requires choosing among seemingly endless objectives (and their constituencies). Unions dislike the second, as the implicit teacher ranking undercuts the single-salary structure at the core of collective bargaining contracts. Rewards get most of the attention, but in my view are often least important; it is the reinforcing cycle between focus and measurement that provides much of the value.

Ideally, Pay for Performance entails a specific bonus (the “Pay”) received upon achieving defined educational outcomes (the “Performance”). These educational outcomes should address a central and acknowledged problem: in Denver, as in most urban centers, the primary need is to both raise overall student performance and close the achievement gap.  How do the current proposals and original plan measure up?

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